

political relationship with each nation, a detailed account of the bases acquired, a shrewd analysis of the various quarrels that emerged, and a careful description of the changes that occurred over the fifty years covered by this book. With some nations, such as Japan, the security relationship displayed a remarkable continuity, while in others, such as Panama and the Philippines, growing nationalist tensions forced the United States eventually to close its bases. America's relationships with Greece, Spain, and Turkey, new allies in the Mediterranean, were always filled with difficulties, while the United States was never able to obtain access to permanent bases in the Middle East. In this area of the world it had to rely on mobile forces and the repositioning of military equipment.

By the mid-1980s America's leasehold empire was under serious strain, beset by nationalist pressures and by what some scholars described as imperial overreach. Sandars believes that critics like Paul Kennedy overemphasized the gap between American resources and obligations, and failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War, the revival of the American economy in the 1990s, and the agility with which the United States adjusted to the new international environment and redefined its informal empire. Between 1989 and 1995 the number of U.S. troops permanently based overseas fell over 50 percent, from 510,000 to 238,000.

Sandars speculates that America's leasehold empire will last, on a reduced scale, far into the new century. "After a long period of mismatch," he writes, "the demands of the U.S. global security system and the resources to sustain it are now back in equilibrium." He is convinced that the benefits of this worldwide system of military bases far outweigh the costs,

and he praises the accomplishments of American foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century. The United States, he concludes, "has emerged with credit and honor from this unique experiment of policing the world, not by imposing garrisons on occupied territory, but by agreement with her friends and allies."

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Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2000. 264pp. \$34.95

In the after-action report on the U.S. occupation of the Rhineland following World War I, Colonel I. L. Hunt wrote, "The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil government functions." "Despite the[se] precedents," he lamented, "the lesson seemingly has not been learned." The military returned to this tradition of forgetting after World War II. Subsequent to that second global conflict, U.S. forces assumed responsibility for over two hundred million people in occupation zones in Asia and Europe at a cost of over a billion dollars a year, yet official military histories barely touch the topic. Texas A&M University professor Nicholas Evan Sarantakes steps in to fill part of the void with a thought-provoking case study of the American occupation of Okinawa from 1945 to the island's formal return to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Sarantakes's thesis is that bureaucratic infighting shaped the course of the occupation as much as did national

security strategy and foreign policy. This finding parallels other research on U.S. postwar operations.

Sarantakes begins his narrative with the 1 April 1945 amphibious assaults launching Operation ICEBERG, an imperfect but ultimately successful campaign. This story has already been well told (particularly in George Feifer's *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* [1992]), but Sarantakes's version is briskly written and engaging. His purpose in beginning with the fight for the island is to illustrate the interservice disagreements that marred operations—difficulties, he argues, that foreshadowed future problems.

The fundamental obstacle, Sarantakes finds, was that the United States lacked an overarching strategy for what to do with the islands. Normally, the military wanted to jettison occupation duties as quickly as possible; Okinawa was a rare exception. Both the Army and the Navy saw the island as a potential base from which to guard against a resurgent Japan or uncooperative Soviet Union. After a few typhoons demonstrated the vulnerability of harbor facilities, the Navy dropped its interest in Okinawa. The Army, however, saw utility in staging troops and bombers on the island and assumed overall control of the occupation. An Army commander was appointed high commissioner, making him the senior U.S. military, political, and diplomatic representative.

The dynamics driving the occupation of Okinawa bear striking resemblance to other major postwar peacekeeping and nation-building efforts, in Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan proper, and Korea. In the early years, 1945–48, high commissioners had a great deal of autonomy in shaping and implementing policies. At the same

time, they had scant resources for managing the occupations, with the result that their efforts to rebuild countries, institute the rule of law, and reconstruct civil societies were limited. In addition, commanders faced such challenges as monetary reform, black-market activity, crime by occupation troops and civilians, housing shortages, poor race relations, and forces ill prepared, inadequately trained, and ineptly organized for occupation duties.

As the Cold War heated up, the U.S. State Department took the lead in setting occupation policies. Most high commissioners became civilians; again Okinawa was a notable exception. The Department of State and the Pentagon were often at odds. The military wanted to hold forward bases like Okinawa, while the State Department lobbied to withdraw troops in order to build up good will with fledgling Cold War allies. The debate over Okinawa was a case in point. Sarantakes documents well the titanic 1961–64 struggle between the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, and General Paul Caraway, U.S. Army, the commander of forces on the island.

The Cold War stimulated overseas investment in strategic areas and kept the troops in place. These commitments allowed for the eventual stability, security, and economic development that would have shortened the requirement for occupation in the first place. These bases did serve their intended purpose. Okinawa was a key support facility during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and then the major staging base for Marine forces (a role that it continues to play).

The belated return of the island to Japan in 1972 concluded an arguably successful but, as Sarantakes demonstrates, troubled occupation. His research suggests

important lessons for the practitioners of military operations other than war. Effective peacekeeping and nation building are not cheap, easy, or brief, but their execution can be greatly facilitated by competent, cohesive, and effective interservice and interagency teams.

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Paul, Septimus H. *Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1941–1952*. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2000. 266pp. \$42.50

With the collapse of Soviet power and the end of the Cold War, the paradigm that helped to explain that era shifted. Scholars seeking to understand better the period are now free to reassess that era, taking into account other variables in the power calculus with the same degree of attention previously concentrated upon the Soviet Union. To cite just one example of this paradigm shift, since the opening of recent British archives scholars have concluded that British foreign and defense policy had a much more decisive impact on the early Cold War than was apparent in earlier considerations. The new study by Septimus H. Paul is one such reassessment.

Paul is a professor of history at the College of Lake County in Grayslake, Illinois. His *Nuclear Rivals* is a meticulous examination of Anglo-American wartime collaboration in the development of the atomic bomb, followed by the decision of the United States after the war to deny Great Britain the fruits of that collaboration—the requisite technologies to build a British atomic bomb. To British eyes, this was a betrayal of solemn (if secret)

promises made by President Franklin Roosevelt to Prime Minister Winston Churchill during the war and of understandings between President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee afterward.

Part of the complexity of Anglo-American relations is to be explained by their multileveled nature. The alliance against Hitler during World War II forged a common front, which coexisted with substantive differences over grand strategy and the postwar political-economic settlement, particularly on questions relating to open markets and decolonization. The desire of the British to exercise joint partnership with the United States in the monopoly of the atomic bomb, and the American reluctance to do so, proved to be particularly divisive. These profound differences continued into the postwar world but were overshadowed by the American and British governments' perceived fear of the common threat from Soviet Russia. One of the truly valuable contributions of *Nuclear Rivals* is Paul's fidelity to this complexity and to the sources in relating the story of American collaboration and noncollaboration with Britain in atomic weapons development. Paul makes no attempt to sweeten or marginalize the differences between the two nations in this area; his approach is explicit, without attention to peripheral issues.

The major contribution of this book is its attention to what used to be called in the literature "the raw materials question." This relates to the American attempt during World War II to secure a monopoly of the world's uranium supply. One complication for the Americans was that the source of the highest-quality uranium, absolutely indispensable for building an atomic bomb, was the then Belgian